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Assertoric Content, Responsibility, and Metasemantics.1 
1. Introduction 
 
That we assert things to one another, and that our doing so is central to our linguistic practice, seems 
beyond question.2 When we assert, there is typically something we can be said to have asserted. This is 
what we might think of  as the truth conditional content of  our assertion. It is the content relative to 
which we define norms of  assertion. That is, it is the content that must be true (or perhaps known, 
believed, or warranted for the speaker) if  an assertion is to deemed normatively acceptable. It is hard to 
make sense of  the notion of  assertion without the notion of  assertoric content.  Yet, as I will illustrate 
in the earlier portions of  this paper, it is not immediately clear what communicative function assertoric 
content actually plays.  
 
Assertoric content must, I argue, be distinguished from both intended content and the content 
determined by standing meaning. Cases of  error, in which a speaker accidentally asserts p despite their 
intention to assert some alternative proposition q, force us to distinguish assertoric content from 
intended meaning. Cases of  modulation drive a wedge between assertoric content and standing 
 
1  Acknowledgements: This paper has had a long history. I started thinking about this as a graduate student in St 
Andrews. The view presented here took shape during my time at Concept Lab at the University of  Oslo. And the final 
paper was written during my time at Leeds. Countless discussions have shaped my view, and this in particular paper. 
Thanks go especially to Mark Bowker, Herman Cappelen, Vera Flocke, Peter Fritz, Joshua Habgood-Coote, Thomas 
Hodgson, Torfinn Huveness, Eliot Michaelson, David Plunkett, Andreas Stokke, Natalia Waights-Hickman and 
audiences at the Universities of  St Andrews and Oslo. I also received incredibly helpful and charitable comments from 
two anonymous reviewers for Mind and Language. Their comments greatly improved the quality of  this paper. The 
project leading to this application has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the 
European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement no. 818633). 
2 Although see Cappelen (2011, 2019) for a dissenting view. It is an assumption of  this paper that we have a reasonably 
clear pre-theoretic notion of  assertion and assertoric content and that this provides the basis for philosophical 
discussions of, for example, the norms of  assertion. The arguments and conclusions of  the paper should be taken as 
conditional on this assumption.  
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meaning. Yet, once separated from standing meaning and intended meaning, it is not clear what role 
assertoric content could play. The aim of  communication is for interlocutors to coordinate on intended 
meanings. Communication breaks down when the audience fails to recover the speaker’s intended 
meaning. And communication is facilitated by knowledge of  standing meaning. That is, knowledge of  
standing meaning, together with contextual knowledge, typically suffices for the audience to recover the 
speaker’s intended meaning, and thus for communication to succeed. It is not clear what role assertoric 
content could play in this process. If  assertoric content plays no role in this process it would seem to be 
superfluous. Yet, given the centrality of  assertion to our thought and talk about language use, assertoric 
content cannot be superfluous. 
 
In order to resolve this puzzle, I argue, we must identify an alternative function for assertoric content. 
The basic idea is this: assertoric content functions as a means for us to track the responsibilities 
undertaken communicators when they speak.3   
 
However, this, by itself, is not very illuminating. There any many things we take responsibility for when 
we speak, and many ways in which we undertake such responsibilities. Not all of  the responsibilities we 
undertake when we assert will correspond to the intuitive notion of  assertiotic content.  
 
I suggest that assertoric commitments are distinguished by their mode of  generation: they obtain 
directly (either compositionally or via bridge principles) in virtue of  the words the speaker uses and 
their manner of  combination. But this raises two further questions: Firstly, why are speakers 
responsible for the content thus generated? And secondly, why is it important for us to distinguish 
between communicative commitments in terms of the manner in which they are generated? Put 
another way: what justifies the central place assertoric commitments seem to occupy in our practices of 
 
3 See Perry (2006), and Borg (2019) for related suggestions. Borg’s picture will be discussed in §2.4.  
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normatively appraising speech if they only differ from other communicative commitments in their 
manner of generation? 
 
My primary focus will be on the first question: I argue that a plausible metasemantic theory must be 
able to make sense of  the fact that speakers are committed to the assertoric contents of  their 
utterances. Some metasemantic theories are better equipped to do this than others. I present a 
metasemantic theory that is particularly well equipped to do so: the value a term receives in context 
corresponds to the use it is most fitting (i.e. there is the most reason) to hold the speaker to in light of  
their utterance. I turn to the second question in the conclusion.  
 
More precisely, the paper will be structured as follows: In section 2 I argue that assertoric content 
cannot be identified with either standing or intended content. This leaves its function mysterious. I 
propose that assertoric content allows us to track commitments generated directly (either 
compositionally, or via bridge principles) by the contextual values of  the words used. But this raises a 
new question: why are we committed to the contents so generated. To answer this question, we must 
turn to metasemantics: we must provide an account of  contextual value that makes good sense of  the 
fact that we are committed to assertoric contents. I provide such an account in section 3.2. I close by 
considering the question of  why it would be worth distinguishing communicative commitments in 
terms of  their manner of  generation.  
 
2. Assertoric Content 
 
As I noted above, when a speaker asserts there will typically be some proposition that they assert. The 
truth or falsity of their assertion will depend on whether or not this proposition is true. Likewise, their 
conformity to the norm of assertion will depend on their relation to this proposition (i.e. do they know 
the proposition? do they believe it?). This is what I have in mind when I speak of assertoric content.  
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2.1. Assertoric Content and Semantic Content 
Assertoric content will be largely determined by the semantic values of the words used by a speaker in 
context. Indeed, assertoric content and semantic content are often equated. However, their equation is 
controversial. Firstly, even theorists who reject traditional externalist semantics (such as Chomsky 
(1995) and Pietroski (2003)) can endorse a notion of assertoric content. For example Pietroski tells us 
that: 
We should be sceptical of the idea that a theory of meaning for a natural language will have 
theorems that specify the truth-conditions of all the declarative sentences of that language. The 
successes in semantics suggest that the theoretical action lies elsewhere; semantics is concerned 
with “internalist” features of linguistic expressions, rather than truth per se. The fact that (an 
utterance of) a sentence has a certain truth-condition is typically an interaction effect whose 
determinants include (i) intrinsic properties of the sentence that we can isolate and theorize 
about, and (ii) a host of facts less amenable to theorizing, like facts about how “reasonable” 
speakers would use the sentence. 
Pietroski, 2003, p 1.  
For Pietroski assertoric content is determined by semantic meaning (internalistically conceived), and 
other factors which he takes to be less amenable to systematic theorising.4  
Secondly, semantic minimalists such as Borg (2004, 2012), and Cappelen and Lepore (2005) 
countenance a minimal propositional and context insensitive form of semantic content that rarely (if 
ever) corresponds to assertoric content, which tends to be richer, more informative, and also highly 
context sensitive (although Borg (2019) argues that minimal content does coincide with assertoric 
content in certain special contexts). 
 
4 It might be worried that the project I am engaged in here is in conflict with the Chomsky/Pietroski view. After all, I will 
be giving an account of  the contextual values (e.g. referents) of  terms on occasions of  use. And this seems to be 
precisely what Chomsky and Pietroski are sceptical of. I will return to this issue in the conclusion when I argue that the 




Finally, even adherents of more traditional approaches to semantics have questioned the identification 
of semantic content with assertoric content. For example, Dummett (1973), Evans (1979), Lewis 
(1980), Stanley (2002), Ninan, (2010), Rabern (2012, 2017), and Yalcin (2014) present a number of 
conceptual and empirical arguments against the identification.5 Regardless of whether or not semantic 
content is to be identified with assertoric content, there is a close relationship between the two. The 
contextual values of the words used (i.e. the values the terms are assigned on an occasion of use), 
whether they be systematically context sensitive terms like ‘tall’, or context insensitive terms (which 
might still be modulated or used loosely) such as ‘raw’, largely determine (either compositionally, or via 
certain bridge principles) assertoric content. This will be crucial in what follows.  
2.2. Assertoric Content and Intended Content 
Assertoric content must be distinguished from intended content. Intended content is the proposition 
the speaker aims to directly communicate with their assertion. That is, its the primary proposition the 
audience must recover if the speaker’s communicative intention is to be satisfied. A core assumption of 
this paper is that communicative success ultimately turns on the recovery of intended content. That is, 
in typical cases of communication the speaker aims for the hearer to recover the content they intend to 
communicate, and the hearer aims to recover the content the speaker intends. Coordination on 
intended content is the core aim of communicative interactions.6 
When all goes well assertoric content and intended content will coincide. However, the two can come 
apart, especially in cases of speaker error. Examples abound from the literature on the metasemantics 
of indexicals, demonstratives, and gradable adjectives. Such cases are controversial. However, these 
controversies need not concern us since we can present analogous cases that do not turn on the values 
assigned to context sensitive terms:  
 
5  See Stonjić (2017) for a reply.  
6 In reality the situation may be more complex than this. It may be that precise coordination on intended content is rare, 
and that interlocutors need only coordinate on sufficiently similar propositions. However, even if  this is the case, the 
proposition the hearer recovers will have to be sufficiently similar to the speaker’s intended proposition in order for 
communication to succeed (see author (2019) for a view along these lines).  
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WHALES: Smith goes on a whale watching trip. He sees a humpback whale, and recognises it 
as such. When he returns to shore he is asked whether he saw anything. In a moment of 
confusion, he misremembers the name for humpbacks and, in a sincere attempt to express his 
belief about the whale he saw, he states “yes, I saw a sperm whale”.  He intended to 
communicate that he saw a humpback whale. In some sense this is what he meant. However, 
this is not what he asserted.  
Smith asserted something false: that he saw a sperm whale. It would stretch credulity to claim 
otherwise. Thus, we have a clear case in which intended content and assertoric content come apart. Of  
course, this does not show that speaker intentions play no role in determining assertoric content. It could 
be, for example, that standing meanings constrain what certain terms can be used to mean, with 
speaker intentions fixing the values of  context sensitive terms, or resolving indeterminacy. Alternatively, 
as I shall suggest later, it may be that speaker intentions are one among a number of  factors which must 
be weighed to determine assertoric content. The considerations presented so far merely show that 
intended content and assertoric content do not always coincide. 
 
However, if  intended content and assertoric content are not to be identified, and communicative 
success turns on the recovery of  intended content rather than assertoric content, then it becomes 
unclear what role assertoric content might play in communication.  
 
2.3. Assertoric Content and Standing Meaning 
 
When considering cases like WHALES it might be thought that we can identify assertoric content with 
the content determined by the standing meaning of  the sentence used (call this level of  content 
‘standing content’). After all, in WHALES the proposition Smith asserted was that corresponding to 




Moreover, if  assertoric content was to be identified with standing content the function of  assertoric 
content would be less puzzling: Standing meaning facilitates the communication of  intended content. 
The mechanisms by which it does so are, of  course, controversial. But on a simple model they can be 
seen as providing a starting point for the audience’s sub-personal inferential processing, the output of  
which is a representation of  the intended content. It is standing meaning which will be modulated (or, 
perhaps, filled in or precisified) by the audience in an attempt to recover intended content.  
 
Unfortunately, assertoric content cannot be identified with standing content. There are several reasons 
for this. Firstly, as previously noted, assertoric content typically coincides with intended content. 
Assertoric and intended content usually only come apart when the speaker has committed some error. 
Standing content corresponds to standing meaning, and standing meaning is the primary input to 
interpretation; that which is modulated to reach a representation of  the intended content. Thus, at least 
if  context sensitivity and modulation are the norm (which I assume they are), standing content and 
intended content will not typically coincide.  
 
Relatedly, many theorists argue that standing meaning will not typically determine a complete 
proposition (Sperber and Wilson, (1986), Bach (1994), Carston (2002), Recanati (2004)).  If  this is 
correct then standing content, unlike assertoric content, will typically be highly indeterminate.  
  
Finally, there are intuitive counterexamples to the identification of  standing content with assertoric 
content:   
 
STEAK: Martha and Bill are eating out at a restaurant. Martha has ordered a well done steak. 
When it arrives she cuts into it only to find that it has been served rare: it is seared on the 
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outside, and only very lightly cooked in the middle. The steak is in clear view of Bill. Martha 
looks to Bill and says ‘my steak is raw’.7  
 
The term ‘raw’ in English means ‘uncooked’. Thus, the standing content for Martha’s utterance (once 
we have adjusted for the indexicality of ‘my steak’) is that her steak is uncooked. However, this is not 
what Martha has asserted. She has not asserted anything false, nor has she violated the norms of 
assertion. What she really asserted is that her steak is undercooked. In this context the term ‘raw’ is 
modulated and takes on a wider meaning. The assertoric content of her utterance corresponds not to its 
standing content, but rather the content determined by the modulated meanings of the terms used.8 
 
2.4. The function of  Assertoric Content 
 
Assertoric content should be distinguished from both from intended content, and standing content. 
Intended content and standing content both have clear communicative functions: Intended content is 
what interlocutors aim to coordinate on. Communicative success or failure will depend on whether or 
not the audience recovers the speaker’s intended content (or, perhaps, a sufficiently similar proposition). 
And standing content corresponds to standing meaning, which facilitates the communication of  
intended content.  
 
 
7 Similar cases abound. Particularly clear is Nunberg’s (1979) case of  the waitress who asserts ‘the ham sandwich left 
without paying’.  
8 This argument depends on our thinking of  ‘standing meaning’ as the meaning of  a sentence in a relatively stable 
conventional public language (e.g. English or French), or a relatively stable idiolect. I take this usage to be standard. 
There are alternative conceptions of  standing meaning according to which speakers typically operate with dynamic 
micro-languages developed and altered on the fly (see Armstrong (2016), and Ludlow (2014)). Proponents of  such 
approaches could plausibly claim that, in the microlanguage spoken by Martha and Bill, ‘raw’ means ‘undercooked’. In 
this case the content of  Martha’s assertion will correspond to what we might call the ‘dynamic standing content’ of  her 
utterance. This will not resolve the problem however, for we are left asking what the function of  dynamic standing 
content is. If  it functions as a primary input to interpretation then, assuming the ubiquity of  context sensitivity it will, 
unlike assertoric content, typically fail to coincide with intended content. If  we deny standing content this function then 
we are free to identify it with assertoric content, but we are left with the mystery as to its function.   
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Unlike intended and standing content, assertoric content lacks a clear communicative function. 
Coordination on assertoric content is not required for successful communication. It is true that, 
typically, recovery of  an utterance’s assertoric content will suffice for communicative success. But this is 
only because assertoric content typically coincides with intended content. When the two come apart, 
recovery of  assertoric content will not suffice for communicative success. Moreover, it is not clear what 
role assertoric content could play in facilitating communication. Assertoric content typically coincides 
with the output of  interpretation, not with the input to interpretation, or the output of  some 
intermediate stage in the interpretative process. So why, then, do we have a concept of  assertoric 
content? And why does it appear to be so important?9 
 
The function I propose is simple, and has been proposed by others: Assertoric content functions as a 
means for us to hold speakers responsible for their utterances. In general, our speech has an impact on 
the world. It changes beliefs, hurts feelings, and alters the normative relations we stand in to others. 
Sometimes this impact is positive, and sometimes it is negative. Either way, it is imperative that we have 
a resource with which to clearly and unambiguously hold one-another responsible (or creditworthy) for 
the potential impact of  our speech.  This is why assorteric content is so important: it tracks the content 
speakers make themselves responsible for through their speech (see Perry (2006), Borg (forthcoming) 
for similar approaches to assertoric content, and for examples of  attempts to characterize the speech 
act of  assertion in terms of  the type of  the type of  commitment assertions generate see Brandom 
(1983, 1994), MacFarlane (2011), Shapiro (forthcoming) for an overview).10 
 
9 It could, of  course, be held that assertoric content, as distinct from intended and standing content, is superfluous 
(Richard Kimberly Heck (2014) comes close to suggesting as much). However, I believe we should resist this 
hypothesis, adopting it only as a last resort. After all, assertions certainly seem to have truth conditions. There certainly 
seems to be a proposition asserted in cases like WHALES and STEAK. Surely there is some good reason for us to have 
these intuitions. Moreover, we have established practices which revolve around assertoric content. For example, the 
norms of  assertion play a key role in our practices of  normatively appraising speech. These norms are defined in terms 
of  assertoric content, not intended or standing content. For these reasons, I think our first response should be to 
identify an alternative role for assertoric content. That is, we must ask what role assertoric content could play if  it plays 
no role in communication. 
 
10 Perry (2006) claims that the term ‘what is said’ is a ‘forensic concept’, having to do with the message a speaker is 
responsible for conveying. I have avoided the term ‘what is said’  here, and opted to focus on ‘assertoric content’ 




As just noted, I am not the first to suggest this function for assertoric content. However, current 
attempts to elucidate this connection run into a number of  problems, and leave some important 
questions unanswered. Perry (2006) does not go into much detail, but Borg (2019) puts the notion of  
what she calls ‘linguistic liability’ to extensive use. She argues that we can carve out roles for minimal 
content, explicature, implicature, and assertoric content in terms of  linguistic liability. She takes ‘strict’ 
linguistic liability to track minimal content, she takes implicature and explicature to correspond to 
different levels of  what she calls ‘conversational liability’, and she takes assertoric content to 
correspond to either explicature or minimal content depending on the type of  liability relevant in 
context.  We might say that a speaker is ‘assertorically liable’ when they produce an utterance with a 
minimal content p, and they are in a context in which strict liability is key (for example, a legal context), 
or else they are highly conversationally liable for p, and they are in a context in which conversational 
liability is key. 
 
Although I am broadly sympathetic to Borg’s approach, there are some important differences between 
Borg’s development of  the responsibility view and my own. Firstly, and most importantly, although 
Borg employs the notion of  linguistic liability, she does not provide an account of  linguistic liability. A 
large part of  what I do in the following sections consists in giving an account of  assertoric liability. 
That is, I suggest an account of  the conditions under which a speaker is assertorically liable for a 
particular proposition. Moreover, in doing so, I go beyond providing an account of  the function of  
assertoric content: I provide an account of  the nature of  assertoric content, and I provide an integrated 
metasemantics of  context sensitive terms. 
 
 
confusion. However, the general claim is similar. Likewise, Borg (forthcoming) argues that both minimal content and 
explicature track distinct levels of  content with different functional roles: minimal content tracks content a speaker is 
‘strictly liable’ for, and explicature tracks the content a speaker is ‘conversationally liable’ for. She takes assertoric 
content to sometimes correspond to minimal content, and sometimes correspond to explicature.  
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A second key difference concerns the way in which explicatures are distinguished from implicatures. 
Borg takes implicature and explicature to correspond to different levels of  linguistic liability. So, for 
Borg, one is always more liable for what is said than what is implicated. As a rough generalization this is 
probably correct. However, it does seem to admit of  exceptions. Consider the following:  
 
LETTER WRITER: Paul Grice famously gave the following example of  implicature:  
A is writing a testimonial about a pupil who is a candidate for a philosophy job, and his 
letter reads as follows: "Dear Sir, Mr. X's command of  English is excellent, and his 
attendance at tutorials has been regular. Yours, etc." Grice, 1989, p33.  
In this case, A has implied that Mr X is not a good candidate. Now suppose that Bill and Bob 
are both philosophers of  language at different universities. They both work on implicature, and 
they each have a particular interest in Grice. Bill is writing a letter of  reference for his rather 
unimpressive student Alex, and he knows that Bob (and only Bob) will be the one to read the 
letter. He also knows that Grice’s letter writer example is salient common knowledge between 
the two of  them. So, in his letter, he simply writes ‘Alex’s command of  English is excellent, and 
his attendance at tutorials has been regular’.  
 
The implication is clear: Alex is not an impressive student. Given the mutual knowledge between them, 
Bill is strongly committed to this. Indeed, I would suggest that in these circumstances, given their 
mutual knowledge of  the Gricean example, his commitment to the claim that Alex is a poor student is 
actually stronger than his commitment to the claim that Alex has a solid grasp of  English. Nonetheless, 
all Bill has said (and all Bill has asserted) is that Alex has an excellent grasp of  English, and attends 
tutorials regularly. He has merely implied that Alex is a poor student. If  this is correct, then we cannot 
make sense of  the implicature/explicature distinction in terms of  different grades of  conversational 
liability.11 
 
11 These are not the only ways in which I depart from Borg, only the most salient. Borg also argues that the notion of  




Although he doesn’t explicitly frame his discussion in terms of  the function of  assertoric content, 
Stainton (2016) also argues that assertoric content can be distinguished from merely implied content by 
virtue of  the of  commitment involved. However, unlike Borg, Stainton takes the commitments to 
differ not in terms of  strength, but rather in terms of  type. Stainton suggests that assertion generates a 
distinctive type of  commitment characterised by a distinctive form of  normative failure. Commitment 
accounts of  assertion (such as those surveyed in Shapiro (forthcoming)) can also be seen as 
characterising the act of  assertion in terms of  the type of  commitment one undertakes when one 
asserts. And there have been recent attempts to makes sense of  the lying/misleading distinction in 
terms of  the distinctive type of  commitments involved in lying as well (for example Viebahn 
(forthcoming)). I’ll focus on Stainton, but indicate the ways in which my worries generalize.  
 
Stainton suggests that, just as promise breaking and adultery are distinctive types of  normative failure 
that could not exist independently of  the specific commitments generated by promising or marriage, 
lying is a form of  normative failure that could not exist without the act of  assertion. It is widely 
accepted that lying requires asserting.12 However, it is not obvious that lying is a distinct type of  
normative failing. Rather, I suspect that lying is one species of  a more general normative failing: 
attempting to communicate something one believes to be false. Of  course, the introduction of  
assertion as a means of  communication introduces the possibility of  failing in this way. But that doesn’t 
mean it introduces a distinct form of  normative failure. When the practice of  sarcasm was first 
 
believes to be false. I am skeptical as to the very notion of  strict liability and minimal content. But even if  I were to 
countenance these notions, I believe that strict liability is not necessary for one to have lied. Consider the following 
example: 
 
 SANDWICH LIE: Mark is a waiter at a cafe. He is also a thief. When a customer who has ordered a ham sandwich 
pays and leaves (taking the sandwich with him) Mark pockets the money and tells the manager ‘the ham sandwich 
left without paying’.  (C.f. Nunberg (1979)).  
 
Mark has clearly lied. Moreover, his lie has nothing to do with the ham sandwich itself  leaving the restaurant without 
paying. His lie concerns the action of  the customer. Indeed, since the customer took the ham sandwich with him, and 
the ham sandwich didn’t pay, the minimal content was actually true.  
12 Indeed, as Michaelson (2016) points out, we can use our intuitions about when a subject has lied to guide our semantic 
theorizing (i.e. as evidence that one proposition rather than some other has been asserted on a particular occasion). 
Michaelson’s ‘lying test’ fits particularly well with the hypothesis that assertion involves undertaking some kind of  
special commitment. However, it doesn’t require anything as strong as the hypothesis that the function of  assertoric 
content is to track these responsibilities.  
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introduced, did this introduce a new form of  normative failure: attempting to communicate something 
one believes to be false via sarcasm? Surely not! What emerged was just a new way to go about failing in 
a familiar manner. So, why should we consider the act of  attempting to communicate something one 
believes to be false via assertion to be a distinctive normative failure? We do have a label for attempting 
to communicate something one believes to be false via assertion, and we don’t have a label for the act 
of  doing so via sarcasm. But giving a normative failing a label is not enough to make it distinctive! 
 
It might be argued that there are independent grounds for thinking that assertoric commitment differs 
in kind from the sort of  commitment we undertake when we merely imply. For example, Fricker (2012) 
has suggested that whilst we are able to maintain plausible deniability about the contents of  
implicatures, we are not able to maintain plausible deniability about the contents of  assertions. 
However, there are reasons to doubt this: Firstly, as Hawthorne (2012) and Peet (2015) have argued, the 
difference here is really only one of  degree. In general, we tend to have a greater degree of  plausible 
deniability with respect to implied contents. However, since language is rife with context sensitivity, and 
even the recovery of  assertoric content requires significant inference on the audience’s behalf, there will 
often be ways for a sufficiently imaginative speaker to maintain some level of  plausible deniability about 
asserted contents. And, as we saw above, there are cases in which we are not able to maintain plausible 
deniability about the contents of  implicatures (Camp 2018 makes a similar point, as does Viebahn 
(2017, 2020, forthcoming) with respect to non-literal utterances and presuppositions). Moreover, even 
if  we were able to maintain plausible deniability about implied but not assertoric content, it is not clear 
that this would render the commitments different in kind. Finally, is not clear in what sense the 
commitments undertaken in LETTER WRITER really differ from the commitments typical of  
assertion. The letter writer will incur negative reactive attitudes and will be held to the content of  their 
implicature if  it is false just as an asserter would. This worry generalizes beyond Stainton’s approach to 
commitment accounts of  assertion in general.13  
 
13 The problems discussed here also generalizes to Viebahn’s (2020) commitment based approach to the lying-misleading 




So, I am not optimistic about the prospect of  distinguishing between assertoric and implied content by 
reference to the type of  commitment we bear to each. Nor am I optimistic about doing so in terms of  
the degree of  commitment involved. This raises a question: in what sense do the commitments generated 
by assertion and implicature differ?  The key difference, I believe, is the mode of generation. Put 
simply, assertoric content, unlike, say, implied content, is determined directly, either compositionally or 
via bridge principles by the contextual values assigned to the worlds used.   
 
But this just raises new questions: Firstly, why should we be held responsible for the content 
determined this way? That is, why is the content determined by the contextual values of the words used 
in context something that speakers make themselves responsible for? Why is it important for us to 
distinguish between communicative commitments in terms of the manner in which they are generated? 
And what justifies the central place assertoric commitments seem to occupy in our practices of 
normatively appraising speech if they only differ from other communicative commitments in their 
manner of generation?14. We will start with the first question. I will turn to the second question in the 
conclusion.   
 
3. Metasemantics, Use, and Responsibility 
 
I closed the previous section by suggesting that assertoric commitments are those that are determined 
directly, either compositionally or via bridge principles by the contextual values assigned to the worlds 
used.  However, I also noted that this raises a question: why, given the determinants of contextual 
value, is the content so generated something we should be held responsible for? This question will be 
easier to answer on some metasemantic views than others.  
 
mislead, not lied. Yet they seem robustly committed to the claim that the student is a poor candidate. Secondly, Viebahn 
characterises the type of  commitment liars undertake in terms of  their ability to maintain coherent deniability regarding 
the content of  their speech act. But as Peet (2015) points out, we are often able to maintain a degree coherent 
deniability regarding the content of  our assertions as well. We would presumably still want to hold that speakers have 
lied when they intentionally assert falsehoods whilst retaining a degree of  deniability.   




Consider the following toy metasemantics: the contextual value assigned to a term on an occasion of 
use corresponds to the use of that term most commonly intended by speakers in the relevant 
community. This metasemantic theory obviously has a number of problems. One problem is that it is 
not clear why it would make sense to hold speakers responsible for the content so generated. The 
theory can be rejected on these (and many other) grounds. Other metasemantic theories do better. 
Consider, for example, the idealized interpreter approach: the view that the value a context sensitive 
term receives on an occasion of use is the value a suitably idealized interpreter would assign.15 The 
idealized interpreter view fits naturally with our hypothesis about assertoric commitments. After all, if a 
reasonable hearer would take a speaker to be using their words in a particular way then, surely, the 
speaker should be held to this use: it is this use that will determine the likely impact of their speech. 
Unfortunately, despite the initial appeal, idealized interpreter approaches are untenable. In the next 
section I will explain why. Following this, I will outline a superior alternative.  
 
3.1. The Idealized Interpreter Approach16 
 
The idealized interpreter approach is subject to a number of  counterexamples. Whilst most of  these 
counterexamples can be overcome with suitable idealizations, the cases will often pull us in conflicting 
directions. This renders the idealized interpreter approach untenable. Idealized interpreter approaches 
will hold that something like the following is true:  
 
IDEAL: The value a context sensitive term receives on an occasion of  use is whatever value an 
interpreter meeting the following conditions ------- would take the speaker to intend.  
 
 
15 See Wettstein (1984), and Romdenh-Romluc (2002, 2006). Additionally, King (2013, 2014a, 2014b), and Armstrong 
(2016) embrace hybrid views according to which, if  a context sensitive term is to take on a particular value, the speaker 
must intend that it do so, and it must be such that a suitably idealized interpreter would assign that value. 
16 The argument presented here is brief, as Nowak and Michaelson (forthcoming) have recently presented a similar case 
against the idealized interpreter approach.  
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Different approaches will fill in the blank in different ways. The problem is that no single way of  filling 
in this blank is satisfactory. Consider the following three ways of  filling in the gap: 
 
GENERIC: The interpreter will be a generic hearer perhaps idealized so as to meet certain 
conditions of  competence and contextual knowledge. 
 
ACTUAL: The interpreter will be a version of  the speaker’s actual audience, perhaps idealized 
so as to meet certain conditions of  competence and contextual knowledge. 
 
EXPECTED: The interpreter will be an idealized version of  the speaker’s expected audience 
(i.e. an audience corresponding to the speaker’s expectations of  their audience) perhaps 
idealized so as to meet certain conditions of  competence and contextual knowledge. 
 
These are the obvious ways of  developing an idealized interpreter approach.  Let us start with 
GENERIC. Consider the following:   
 
X-RAY: Christina is teaching a course to advanced medical students. She is showing the 
students an x-ray image. This image would, to any normal viewer, be utterly unintelligible. 
However, the medical students possess specialist knowledge, and can interpret the x-ray easily. 
She points to an area with what, to the normal observer, would appear to be a number of  grey 
blobs. She says, intending to refer to the blob in the centre, ‘that is a rupture’. Her students, due 
to their skill in reading x-rays, and their prior medical knowledge, correctly recognise the blob 
she is referring to. They take her to be saying, of  the blob, that it is (or, represents) a rupture.  
 
A generic competent hearer would not be able to assign a determinate referential intention to Christina. 
They would have no way of  telling which blob she intended to refer to. Thus, GENERIC seemingly 
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predicts that Christina fails to refer to any particular blob. This is the wrong prediction. Christina said 
that the central blob is a rupture.  
 
Of  course, GENERIC could be further filled in so that it gets the correct result. We might maintain 
that our generic hearer must know the conversational common ground (King (2013, 2014a, 2014b) 
adopts this approach), or we might maintain that they must meet certain of  the speaker’s expectations. 
But such idealizations push us away from GENERIC and towards versions of  ACTUAL or 
EXPECTED.  
 
Next consider ACTUAL: It is clear that ACTUAL gets the correct result with respect to X-RAY. 
Christina’s actual audience, due to their specialist knowledge, is able to correctly recover the intended 
content of  her utterance. Unfortunately, ACTUAL is rendered untenable by the following case:  
 
SPEAKS’S LECTERN: I teach Philosophy 101 in a large auditorium which darkens during the 
lecture so that the students can better see the slides; in fact, though, it becomes a bit darker than 
it needs to, to the point where I can’t see the students during the lecture. The students have 
figured this out, and now, very quietly, exit the room minutes after the lights go down, and 
return minutes before the lights go back up. In the interim, I’m speaking to an empty room…... 
During the lecture, I might use plenty of  demonstratives; and it seems to me very clear that 
many of  them might well have semantic values. If, pointing clearly and carefully at the lectern, I 
say ‘That lectern . . . ’ it seems clear that the semantic value of  ‘that lectern’ is, just as it would 
be had the students not left, the lectern. 
Speaks, 2016, 312. 
 
Since the lecturer has no audience, there is no object that the actual audience (or an idealized version 
thereof) would take him to be referring to. Thus, ACTUAL seemingly predicts that the lecturer’s use of  
‘that lectern’ fails to receive a contextual value. Once again, this is the wrong result. The lecturer 
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referred to the lectern. The truth or falsity of  his utterance will depend on whether or not the lectern 
has whatever property he predicated of  it.  
 
EXPECTED does better here. The lecturer takes himself  to be addressing a group of  normal students. 
Any audience satisfying the lecturer’s expectations would successfully recognise his intention. 
Unfortunately, EXPECTED is also subject to counterexample. Consider the following:  
 
FRENCH INVASION. Fernando is taking part in a re-enactment of  the Norman Conquest. 
The re-enactment is to be staged in a manor house. Fernando is to play the part of  Harold's 
messenger, who announces to the King that the French are invading England. At the appointed 
time, Fernando bursts into the main hall and announces to the assembled guests,  
 
(2) Now the French are invading England!  
 
However, Fernando has confused the date of  the re-enactment. He has arrived a week early and 
made his announcement to wedding guests who are staying at the manor, not other people 
involved in the re-enactment of  the Norman Conquest. The wedding guests are all panic-
stricken, as they think France has just declared war on England.  
Romdenh-Romluc, 2002, 37.  
 
This case is more fanciful than the others. But if  we imagine it taking place in a context of  extreme 
tension between the UK and France (perhaps the Brexit negotiations have really gone south) it 
becomes plausible that Fernando has accidentality stated that the French are currently invading England. 
Yet EXPECTED predicts otherwise: Fernando takes his audience to be aware of  the pretence. An 
audience meeting his expectations would take his use of  ‘now’ to refer to 1066. This pushes us back 
toward versions of  ACTUAL or GENERIC. But we have seen that such approaches are subject to 
counter example. It is possible that further patches could be applied to the idealized interpreter 
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approach (although Nowak and Michaelson (forthcoming) argue that this is unlikely). However, I think 
this problem is sufficiently pressing that it is worth looking for an alternative. 
 
3.2. The Fittingness Approach 
We are looking for a metasemantic theory that makes good sense of the fact that speakers should be 
held responsible for the contents directly generated, either compositionally or via bridge principles, by 
the contextual values assigned to the worlds used. The idealized interpreter approach was promising in 
this regard. However, it appears untenable on closer inspection. It is time to consider an alternative.  
Just as we can be held to particular claims, we can be held to particular word uses. Returning to our 
earlier examples, there is a clear sense in which Martha should not be held to the standard use of ‘raw’, 
and Smith, despite his intentions, should be held to the standard use of ‘sperm whale’. My proposal, 
roughly, is that the contextual value a word receives on an occasion simply corresponds to the use of 
that word it is most fitting to hold the speaker to. Assertoric content, being a function of contextual 
values, will thus correspond to the proposition it is most fitting to hold the speaker to in light of the 
words used.17 Thus, the fittingness view provides a simple explanation for the fact that speakers are 
responsible for assertoric contents.  
This approach parallels ‘fittingness’ approaches to value and responsibility familiar from metaethics. 
The fittingness approach to value holds that to be valuable is to be a fitting object of favoring attitudes. 
The fittingness approach to responsibility analyzes one’s being responsible for φ in terms of  its being 
fitting to hold one responsible for φ.18 The basic thought behind these approaches is that value and 
responsibility are both epistemologically and metaphysically mysterious. However, our practices of  
 
17 One might reasonably ask how the composition/bridge principles fit into all of  this. The way I see it, these principles 
describe how, typically, audiences automatically and involuntarily go from an assignment of  word meaning to an 
assignment of  utterance meaning. So, if  a competent audience assigns the most fitting contextual values, they will 
always end up interpreting the speaker as aiming to communicate the proposition determined in this way. This is why it 
will be fitting to hold the speaker to the proposition determined in this way. The reasoning here is similar to that I gave 
when motivating the ideal interpreter approach. However, the same problems do not arise, as we do not get the same 
variability in assignements of  meaning between different seemingly legitimate interpreters. The relevant 
composition/bridge principles do not vary between interpreters.  
18 See Zimmerman (2010) for a discussion of  the parallels between fittingness approaches to value and responsibility.  
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valuing things or holding people responsible are not especially mysterious. For example, it is clear that 
we do value things, and that we can be more or less justified in doing so. Thus, we can render value less 
mysterious by making sense of  it in terms of  our practice of  valuing.  
Assertoric content is similarly mysterious: it is hard to give a plausible theory of  the grounds of  
assertoric content or the determination of  contextual value. However, our practices of  holding one 
another to particular claims, or particular word uses are not at all mysterious. So, by making sense of  
assertoric content in terms of  these practices, we are able to demystify our metasemantics. Moreover, if  
the fittingness approach to responsibility is correct, then the word uses we are responsible for will be 
precisely those it is most fitting to hold us to. So, there will be a level of  content we are responsible for 
that is directly determined by the word uses it is most fitting to hold us to on an occasion of  use. This 
level of  content is an obvious candidate for assertoric content.  
Of  course, this still leaves many questions unanswered. Firstly, it is natural to ask, what is it to hold a 
speaker to a particular word use? Well, holding a speaker to a particular word use (and a corresponding 
claim) involves adopting a complex of attitudes and dispositions toward the speaker based on both the 
connotative aspect of the word’s use, and the content determined by its use in its linguistic context.  
These attitudes will include simple reactive attitudes (such as negative appraisal if the word carries a 
harmful connotation, or if the corresponding claim is false), together with more complex dispositions 
and normative expectations (such as the expectation that the speaker will retract their claim if it is false, 
and that they will clarify their word use if the corresponding claim or connotation fails to correspond to 
their intention). Providing a full account of the complex of attitudes and dispositions involved in 
holding a speaker to a particular claim would require significant empirical input, and is beyond the 
scope of this paper. However, I assume that most readers will experienced enough communicators to 
have have a good sense of what is involved.  
Secondly, what is fittingness? If our hope is to demystify our metasemantics, then we had better be able 
to make good sense of this core notion. I, following the dominant trend in metaethics, am 
understanding fittingness in terms of reasons (see, for example, Scanlon (1998)): the word use it is 
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fitting to hold a speaker to on a given occasion is whatever word use there is the most objective reason 
to hold them to. There are many reasons for which we might hold a speaker to a particular use of a 
term, or to a particular claim. For example, the fact that a generic, expected, or actual audience member 
would interpret a speaker in a particular way will generally constitute a reason to hold a speaker to that 
interpretation. Likewise, the fact that the speaker intends to use a term in a particular way will 
constitute a reason to hold them to that use. These, and potentially innumerable other considerations 
will have to be weighed against one another in a given case in order to determine the use to which it is 
most fitting to hold a speaker. In some contexts some such factors may be weighed more heavily than 
in others. 
The fittingness approach is, thus, similar to the ‘all things considered judgment’ approach advocated by 
Gauker (2008). Gauker, who is concerned primarily with the values of demonstratives, tells us that 
there are a number of criteria that ought to be satisfied by the value of a demonstrative (p 364-5):19  
1. Salience: the referent should be an object the audience can easily pick out. 
 
2. Prior reference: The referent should be something which has been referred to in the prior 
discussion. 
 
3. Relevance: The referent should be something there is reason to talk about. 
 
4. Charity: The referent should yield a reasonable interpretation of  the utterance. 
 
5. Pointing: If  the speaker points to a particular object, then the referent should be one that 
intersects the line following from their finger. 
 
6. Location in a series: If objects are being investigated in a series the referent should be the 
next in line to be considered. 
 
The actual value of a given demonstrative, he tells us, is the unique value that adequately satisfies these 
criteria, and does so better than any other value. The value that best satisfies these criteria is determined 
by an all things considered judgment.  
 
19 He doesn’t take any of these criteria to be strictly necessary. Nor does he take the list of criteria to be exhaustive.  
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Despite the similarities, the fittingness approach and all things considered judgment approach come 
apart in important ways. In particular, there will be cases in which the referent that best satisfies 
Gauker’s criteria is not the value that it would be most fitting to hold the speaker to. Consider the 
salience criteria: different objects will typically be more or less salient to different audiences Suppose 
that there are two potential referents, A&B, that satisfy all but the salience condition equally well. 
Furthermore, suppose that A would be more salient to an attentive audience member. But, since the 
audience is lazy and inattentive, B is more salient to the actual audience. Which object best satisfies 
Gauker’s criteria? It is not clear, but in typical cases it will seem most fitting to hold the speaker to the 
use that picks out object A. After all, in typical cases it will not be appropriate to hold the speaker to an 
interpretation that results from the audience’s culpable inattentiveness. So, if Gauker’s criteria was to 
pick out the most fitting referent to hold the speaker to, we’d have to interpret the salience criteria as 
picking out the value most salient to an attentive responsible audience member. But sometimes this will 
get us the wrong results. For example, if the stakes for misinterpretation are extremely high, and the 
speaker has good reason to believe that their audience is not fully competent or attentive, it becomes 
more fitting to hold them to the referent most salient to the actual audience. After all, in such contexts 
the speaker should be more senitive to the possibility (and consequences) of misinterpretation by an 
inattentive audience member. Similar problems arise for Gauker’s other criteria. More generally, it is 
not clear that there is a set of fixed criteria that ought to be satisfied by a demonstrative referent. In 
different contexts there will be very different operative reasons to hold speakers to particular claims.  
The upshot of this is that the fittingness approach makes better sense of the function of assertoric 
content. Semantic values will, on Gauker’s approach often approximate the value it is most fitting to 
hold the speaker to. However, they will not track these responsibilities as reliably as the fittingness 
approach.   
There is a second major difference between Gauker’s approach and the fittingness approach:  Unlike 
Gauker’s approach, the fittingness approach allows for communicative intentions to be one of  the 
determinants of  contextual value. It also allows that the manner in which an ideal interpreter would 
23 
 
interpret an utterance is one of  the determinants of  contextual value: The fact that a speaker intended 
(perhaps reasonably) to use a word in a particular way counts strongly in favour of  our holding them to 
this use20, as does the fact that a reasonable audience member would interpret them in that way. 
However, such factors will have to be weighed against one another, and potentially against many other 
factors, to determine contextual value, and thus assertoric content. Thus, the fittingness approach is, 
unlike Gauker’s, able to capture the appeal of  its two closest rivals: the idealized interpreter approach, 
and the intentionalist approach.   
 
We can see how such factors might be weighed to determine contextual value by returning to some of  
the cases we considered earlier:  
 
WHALES: Smith uttered the sentence ‘I saw a sperm whale’. When he used the term‘sperm 
whale’ he really meant ‘humpback whale’. This counts in favour of  holding him to a use of  
‘sperm whale’ according to which ‘sperm whale’ picks out humpback whales. However, this 
reason is clearly outweighed by the fact that any normal audience member of  the type Smith 
might encounter in this situation would take him to mean that he saw a sperm whale. In light of  
this, they would likely form the false belief  that he saw a sperm whale. The blame for their false 
belief  would land squarely on Smith. Thus, it is more fitting to hold Smith to the claim that he 
saw a sperm whale.21  
 
20 Some theorists (such as Bach (2017), Gauker (forthcoming), Glanzberg (2007, 2009) doubt that speakers typically have 
intentions regarding the values assigned to particular words in context. In one sense I am sympathetic with this thought: 
I doubt that speakers explicitly have such intentions. However, I take it to be clear that speakers have communicative 
intentions, and I believe that communicative intentions embed intentions regarding the way in which the audience 
should take the speaker to be using their words. This is argued for convincingly by Viebahn (forthcoming). 
21 It might seem that the explanation I am giving here is circular: I have argued that we need a metasemantics that makes 
sense of  our being committed to the content determined by the contextual values of  the words used. But here it looks 
like I am suggesting that the contextual value of  the words used is determined by the assertoric commitments that 
would be generated by this contextual value. But this is not quite right: There being most objective reason to hold the 
speaker to using ‘Sperm whales’ to pick out sperm whales is explained in part by the fact that any normal audience 
member would interpret him as intending to communicate that he saw a sperm whale. They would, thus, form a false 
belief. And this is something for which the speaker should be held responsible. Importantly, the notion of  assertoric 
content is never evoked here - assertoric content is not simply the content that a normal competent audience member 
would take to be intended (this would be a version of  the idealized interpreter view). The contents evoked in this 
explanation are intended content and, building on this, what a normal interpreter would take to be the intended content. 




STEAK: Martha uttered the sentence ‘my steak is raw’. Raw, in English, means uncooked. This 
counts in favour of  holding her to a use of  ‘raw’ according to which it means ‘uncooked’. 
However, no reasonable individual in this situation would take Martha to be using ‘raw’ literally. 
Moreover, she did not intend to be using ‘raw’ literally, and she had good reason to expect that 
her audience was reasonable and competent. Thus, the fact that ‘raw’ literally means uncooked 
does not count for much in this context.  
 
X-RAY: Here the speaker knows a great deal about her audience. She knows that her audience 
has specialist knowledge not available to the average language user. Thus, the fact that an 
average language user would not understand her holds little weight when we consider what 
claim she should be held to. It is thus appropriate to hold her to her intended use of  ‘that’. 
 
SPEAKS’S LECTERN: Here the speaker does not have an audience, thus the reaction of  the 
actual audience holds no weight whatsoever. However, the speaker has many reasonable beliefs 
about his audience, and these reasonable beliefs affect what it is reasonable to hold him to. 
Moreover, he has a clear communicative intention which aligns with these reasonable 
expectations. Thus, the overall balance of  reasons counts in favour of  holding him to be 
referring to the lectern.  
 
FRENCH INVASION: Fernando also had reasonable beliefs about his audience. The fact that 
his expected audience would interpret him as referring to 1066 is a good reason to hold him to 
this interpretation. However, his beliefs were badly mistaken. As a result (and through no fault 
of  their own) his audience formed a false belief, and panic ensued. This, I believe, outweighs 
Fernando’s reasonable beliefs: he was the one who put himself  out there and took a risk with 
his audience’s doxastic states. He reasonably expected this risk to be negligible.  But, since he 
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was wrong, and since his audience had no active role in these events, the buck ultimately stops 
with him. 
 
It is also worth briefly considering cases of  speaker error in which  the audience is able to 
accommodate the error, as these cases might be thought to be problematic for the fittingness approach. 
Consider the following:22  
 
GRANDMOTHER: A grandmother regularly mixes up the names of  her dog Moomin, and 
her grandson Peter. However, it is almost always clear from the context who she intends to refer 
to. One day, whilst speaking to someone who knows her well, she says “Peter was burying a 
bone in the garden earlier”. It is clear to the audience that she means to refer to her dog rather 
than her grandson. It might seem that the fittingness account makes the wrong prediction here. 
Intuitively, the assertoric content of  her utterance is that her dog was burying a bone. Yet, there 
seems to be a sense in which it would be fitting to hold her to the claim that her grandson was 
burying a bone – a request for clarification would not be out of  order. So, does the fittingness 
account make the wrong prediction here? No. According to the fittingness approach the 
contextual value a term receives on an occasion of  use is the value it is most fitting to hold the 
speaker to. And this is the use that corresponds to the intuitive assertoric content of  her 
utterance. It is most fitting to take her use of  ‘Peter’ to refer to her dog, and to hold her to this 
use.  After all, a request for clarification would likely be met with “you know exactly who I 
meant”, and it would be inappropriate to direct any negative reactive attitudes toward her on the 
basis of  her grandson’s not having buried a bone in the garden.  
Some cases will be clearer than others. For example, I take X-RAY and SPEAKS’S LECTERN to be 
clearer than FRENCH INVASION. This is true with respect to intuitions about contextual value and 
assertoric content, along with our responsibility judgements. That is, in FRENCH INVASION it is less 
 
22 This case is due to an anonymous referee.  
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intuitively obvious that the Fernando’s use of  ‘now’ refers to the present rather than 1066, and it is also 
less clear which use he should be held to. Intuitions about such cases will, I believe, largely depend on 
the normative weight we are inclined to give to different competing considerations (e.g. how heavily 
should we weigh the fact that Fernando reasonably believed his audience to be in on the pretence?).  
3.3 Problems for Fittingness?23 
The fittingness approach to contextual metasemantics seems promising. However, fittingness 
approaches in metaethics face a number of  well known problems. It is natural to worry that these 
problems will carry over. I will briefly consider two of  the most well known problems here.  
The most well known problem for reasons first fittingness approaches is the wrong kind of  reasons 
problem: take any example of  something it is not fitting to value. We can always create a fictional 
scenario in which there are overwhelming reasons to value that object. Yet, the object does not thereby 
become a fitting object of  value. For example, suppose an evil demon threatens to destroy the world if  
we don’t start to value rudeness. In this scenario, we have overwhelming reason to value rudeness. Yet, 
it does not suddenly become fitting to value rudeness. The analogue for fittingness based 
metasemantics is as follows: A demon promised to destroy the world if  we don’t hold a speaker to a 
particular use of  ‘that’. This is a good reason to hold them to the relevant use of  ‘that’. But it doesn’t 
make it fitting to hold the speaker to the relevant use of  ‘that’. It is the wrong kind of  reason.  
 
The most common approach to the wrong kind of  reasons problem is to say that fittingness is only 
determined only by reasons of  the right kind. The question then becomes: what are the right kinds of  
reasons? There is a vast literature on this question. So, there is not sufficient space to defend any 
particular solution. However, I will briefly mention where my own sympathies lie: I suspect that reasons 
of  the right kind are ‘object based reasons’ rather than ‘state based reasons’:  
 
 
23 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to discuss these issues.  
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State based vs object based reasons: The wrong kinds of  reasons for an attitude are those 
that derive simply from one’s holding the attitude in question. These are ‘state based’ 
reasons. The right kinds of  reasons derive from properties of  the object of  the attitude (in 
this case, the relevant utterance). These are ‘object based’ reasons. See Parfit (2001), and 
Piller (2006) for defenses of  this approach. 
 
The demon’s promise provides a reason to hold the speaker to a particular use of  ‘that’. However, this 
reason derives not from features of  the utterance itself, but rather from the consequences of  holding 
the speaker to a particular use of  ‘that’ (independently of  any features of  the utterance itself). So, the 
demon’s promise generates only a state based reason. On the other hand, the speaker’s intention to 
identify a particular object via their use of  ‘that’, or the fact that a suitably idealized interpreter would 
take the speaker to be referring to a particular object are object given reasons for holding the speaker to 
a particular claim. That is, they concern features of  the utterance itself, rather than consequences of  
holding the speaker to a particular use of  ‘that’.24  
Fittingness approaches to value also face the problem of  solitary goods (Bykvist (2009)): fitting 
attitudes approaches hold that a state is valuable iff  it would be fitting to favor it. However, there are 
states that it would be impossible to favor, but that nonetheless have value. Consider, for example, the 
state of  there being ‘happy egrets, but no past, present, or future agents’ (Bykvist (2009, p5)). This is a 
state of  affairs it is impossible to favor. For example, one could not take pleasure in this state of  affairs, 
because that would require there to be at least one agent. Likewise, one could not strive to bring about 
this state of  affairs. In general, it is hard to identify a favoring attitude one can coherently take toward 
this state. Yet, it still seems to be, in some sense, a good state of  affairs.  
 
24For alternative accounts of  the ‘right kind of  reason’ which are consistent with the reasons based approach to fittingness 
see Gibbard (1990), Hieronymi, (2004), Lang (2008), Rowland (2013), Samuelsson (2013), Schroeder (2010), Skorupski 
(2007), Stratton-Lake (2005), and Way (2012). The wrong kind of  reasons problem can also be avoided by treating 
fittingness as prior to reasons(see Zimmerman (2010) and McHugh and Way (2016)).  I believe the fittingness view of  
contextual value works just as well on such ‘fittingness first’ approaches. However, a number of  my claims would have 
to be rephrased in terms of  ‘fit making facts’ rather than reasons.  
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There is no clear analogue of  this problem for the fittingness approach to metasemantics. Bykvist’s 
worry turns on the fact that states of  affairs are subjects of  value, and we can think of  states of  affairs 
that could not be valued. However, our concern is with the fitting response to utterances – a type of  
action. We can, of  course, imagine worlds containing short lived solitary agents who produce what 
seem to be utterances. However, in order to be problematic for the fittingness approach these 
utterances would need to have contents. Yet, it strikes me that such solitary utterances would have no 
content. If  a lone short lived speaker in a world containing only themselves utters “I am lonely” they 
wouldn’t thereby say that they were lonely. They would merely be producing the same noises that, if  
produced by an English speaker in a relevant context in our world, would mean that the speaker is only. 
Consider another language in which “I” typically means “cats”, “are” has the same meaning as in 
English, and “lonely” means “good company”. Call this language “Smenglish”. There is a possible 
community of  Smenglish speakers. And the noises produced by our solitary speaker would, if  produced 
by a Smenglish speaker in the right context, mean “Cats are good company”. Our solitary speaker no 
more says that they are lonely than that cats are good company.  
 
Reisner (2015) outlines a similar problem that carries over to events (of  which I take actions to be a 
species): he gives an example of  an event that is good only if  nobody favors it, and bad if  somebody 
favors it. To generate an analogous problem for our metasemantics we’d need either a case in which a 
speaker is (intuitively) responsible for a certain use of  a word only if  no one would hold him to that 
use, or a case in which a speaker says that p if  they are not held to p, but doesn’t say p if  they are held 
to p. A case of  either sort would be problematic for the fittingness approach. I cannot begin to imagine 
how the first kind of  case could be developed. And the closest I can think of  to the second would be 
as follows:   
SLOOP: Fred and Freda are talking. Fred says the following: “When I utter the sentence ‘I want 
a sloop’ what I mean is conditional on your reaction. If  you take ‘sloop’ to mean ‘cup of  tea’, 
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then ‘sloop’ means cup of  coffee, and if  you take ‘sloop’ to mean ‘cup of  coffee’ then ‘sloop’ 
means cup of  tea”. Fred then says ‘I want a sloop’.  
What does Fred say when he states ‘I want a sloop’? Well, it is not clear that he actually says anything. 
Nor is it clear that there is any proposition it is fitting to hold him to. If  Freda were to hold him to the 
claim that he wants a coffee this would be inappropriate. Suppose that Freda does hold him to the 
claim that he wants a coffee. Does this thereby make it the case that he has said that he wants a cup of  
tea? It is not clear to me that it does. But, if  Freda’s reaction does make it the case that he has said he 
wants a cup of  tea, it would be fitting to hold him to that claim. So, it is hard to generate an analogue 
of  the problem of  solitary goods for our fittingness based metasemantics. This should be unsurprising: 
Bykvist and Reisner’s objections are aimed at fittingness approaches to value. But the fittingness 
approach to metasemantics is more closely modelled on fittingness approaches to responsibility. 
Conclusion 
 
I started with a puzzle: once distinguished from intended content and standing content it is no longer 
clear why assertoric content is important. It seems to lack an obvious role. Yet it must play some 
important role in our communicative practices, otherwise we would not track assertoric content, and it 
would not seem so central to our practices of  appraising speech. In response I suggested that assertoric 
content provides a means for us to track and talk about the commitments we undertake when we 
speak. However, there are different levels of  content we become responsible for through speech. For 
example, there is a sense in which we are responsible for the contents of  our implicatures as well as our 
assertions. So, we need a way to distinguish assertoric commitments from other commitments. I 
suggested that we do so in terms of  the manner in which these commitments are generated: assertoric 
commitments are generated directly by the contextual values of  the words used.  
 
This raised two questions: 1. Why is the content determined in this way something that speakers make 
themselves responsible for? 2. Why is it important for us to distinguish between communicative 
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commitments in terms of the manner in which they are generated? I have spent most of the paper 
answering this first question, and drawing out the lessons for metasemantics: I suggested that A) 
assertoric content is the content it is fitting (i.e. there is most reason) to hold a speaker to in light of 
their utterance, B) contextual value corresponds to the word use it is fitting (i.e. there is most reason) to 
hold a speaker to. This approach was shown to do better than its closest rival: the idealized interpreter 
approach. It was also shown to explain the appeal of both the idealized interpreter approach, and 
intentionalism. Indeed, not only does the fittingness view explain the appeal of its nearest rivals, it also 
captures the grain of truth in a thought often appealed to by those skeptical of traditional approaches to 
semantics (such as Pietrotski (2003), cited in §2.1): the truth conditions of a given utterance will be 
sensitive to innumerable factors that are resistant to systematic theorizing. As we have seen, the factors 
that determine the claim it is most fitting to hold a speaker to (and, thus the assertoric content of their 
utterance) will vary from context to context. So, in this sense, a fully systematic metasemantics does 
seem beyond the reach of science. However, this does not prevent us from understanding the 
determination of assertoric content, and explaining why particular terms receive particular values in 
particular contexts.   
 
Having answered this first question we should, in closing, consider the second. Here is the question: 
There is a distinction between assertoric and other forms of content. This distinction seems important, 
we have a special set of concepts for tracking this distinction (for example, the concepts of assertoric 
content, of implied content, of presupposed content etc.). Moreover, assertoric content seems special 
in the following way: our practices of appraising communicative acts seem to centre on assertoric 
content. Many theorists assume that assertion, unlike other forms of  communication (such as 
implicature), are committal. Or, they at least assume that assertion is committal in a special normatively 
significant way. If  they are right then it would be unmysterious why we consider the distinction between 
assertoric and other forms of  content to be so important. However, I (along with others, for example 
Hawthorne (2012), Peet (2015), and Viebahn (2017, 2020, Forthcoming)) have suggested that assertoric 
content does not carry with it a distinct form of  commitment lacking from other speech acts. Rather, I 
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have argued that the difference concerns the manner in which the commitments are generated. But why 
would it matter how the commitments are generated? If  this is where the distinction between assertoric 
and other forms of  content resides, why is this distinction important?  
 
My answer is as follows: It is clearly important for us to be able to track the commitments speakers 
undertake when they communicate. However, this is really more important for audiences than it is for 
speakers. As speakers we will often (for good and bad reasons) wish to avoid being held to the things 
we have communicated. Moreover, even as audiences it sometimes suits us for there to be means of  
communication where the responsibilities undertaken are not so easily tracked: there will sometimes be 
information that speakers would be less likely to share if  they could easily be pinned down as having 
done so. Audiences would be shut off  from this information if  speakers did not have a less committal 
means of  communication at their disposal. These competing demands pull us in different directions: 
There is pressure for us to develop a set of  conceptual resources for tracking the commitments 
speakers undertake when they communicate. But there is also pressure for these resources to be 
imperfect.  
 
One way of  achieving this is by drawing a distinction between different ways of  generating 
communicative commitments, and centring our practices of  appraising speech on one such manner of  
generating communicative commitments. This is reflected in the set of  practices and conceptual 
resources we have available for appraising communicative acts. It is true that we have concepts such as 
‘insinuation’ and ‘presupposition’ for tracking non-assertorically communicated contents. But far more 
central to our practices of  reporting speech, and far more easily available to the average language user, 
are the resources we use to track assertoric commitment (for example, said that reports). Moreover, it is 
these commitments to which our communicative norms, and our most damning appraisals of  defective 
speech (e.g. ‘lie’) most obviously apply. There is, in this sense, an imbalance in the resources we have 
available for tracking and holding speakers to the commitments they undertake when they speak. This 
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imbalance places assertoric commitments above all others. And it reflects the conflicting pressures 
governing the development of  the resources we have for tracking communicative commitments.  
 
But surely there are other ways in which our resources for tracking communicative commitments could 
have developed. Why do we distinguish between communicative commitments specifically in terms of 
their manner of generation? Well, the choice could be arbitrary. There is pressure for the resources we 
posses for tracking communicative commitments to develop in such a way that there is some such 
imbalance. Perhaps it is just by chance that this is our practices developed as they did. But think more 
can be said in favor of distinguishing between communicative commitments in terms of their manner 
of generation: Doing so gives us a specific method for generating easily trackable and not so easily 
trackable commitments: to generate easily trackable commitments, generate your commitments directly. 
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